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Abstract 
We examine the impact of market size difference on the government R&D policies to provide strategic advantage to domestic firms 
competing with foreign firms over differentiated products. Based on a model where firms make endogenous decision on the R&D 
investment to reduce the production cost, we demonstrate that as the level of product differentiation is lower with higher 
competition between firms, a country with a smaller market size has a higher incentive to provide R&D subsidies more 
aggressively. Contrarily, when the level of product differentiation is higher with lower competition between firms, a country with 
a larger market size has a higher incentive to provide R&D subsidies. These findings implicate that when a large economy has a 
higher market power with more differentiated products, the R&D policy incentives will aggravate the asymmetry between the large 
economy and the small economy. Therefore, additional measures are required to counterbalance the increasing inequality between 
asymmetric countries when the level of product differentiation is higher than the critical level. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences. 
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1. Introduction 
With the rapid adoption of the information technologies throughout the wide range of industries since 1980s, the 
economies of scale effect plays dominant role not only in manufacturing industries but in all technology intensive 
sectors. These trends have worked as a driving force for increased market power of oligopoly firms in all major 
industries. Consequently, the strategic trade and R&D policies to provide strategic leadership to the domestic firms 
have attracted heavier political weight.    
Moreover, the increased market power is reflected with higher product differentiation via technological market 
power and brand market power. As a result, the high value added industries are characterized by a higher level of 
production differentiation that cannot be mimicked or copied by the prospective competitors. In this context, this paper 
© 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences.
448   Young-Han Kim and Bonju Gu /  Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  447 – 454 
 
examine the how different level of product differentiation and market size asymmetry influence firms’ R&D 
investment policies for cost competitiveness and the government R&D policies.  
When corporate R&D investment strategies are mainly driven by the motivation to obtain price competitiveness 
with cost reduction effects of R&D, the actual R&D investment is mainly decided by the level of market competition, 
which is affected by the level of product differentiation. The relationship between the level of product differentiation 
and corporate R&D investment and government R&D policies were explored by Haaland and Kind (2008). They have 
demonstrated that when the level of production differentiation is lowered, the level of market competition is increased, 
eventually leading to a monopoly with the exit of inefficient firms. These dynamic changes of market structure with 
the lowering level of product differentiation reduce the rationale for government R&D subsidies when the 
homogenization of the products is higher than the critical level.  
This paper aims to enlarge our understanding about the relationship between the level of market competition and 
optimal R&D policies integrating the impact of market size of asymmetry when representative firms from each country 
compete in both markets. We demonstrate that the impact of the different level of product differentiation on the optimal 
R&D policies shows opposite features between a country with a large market size and a country with a small market 
size. For a country with a large market size, higher production homogenization with increased competition reduces 
the level of optimal R&D subsidy. On the other hand, for a country with a small market size, a higher level of 
production differentiation increases the level of optimal R&D subsidies. The economic intuition behind these finding 
is that for a small country with a lower market power, the benefits from R&D subsidies in increased in secured markets 
with higher production differentiation. In case of a large economy, the higher competition caused by the lower product 
differentiation provides higher benefits from the unit R&D subsidies supported by higher market power. 
The analysis of the role of R&D subsidies to provide strategic advantages for the domestic firms has been pioneered 
by the seminal paper of Spencer and Brander (1983). Contrary to the previous literatures that argue trade interventions 
in general deteriorate social welfare by price distortion, Spencer and Brander has demonstrated the welfare improving 
effects of strategic R&D subsidies.    
Isabel Busom(1999) examined the empirical evidences of S&D subsidies’ effects. The main findings are that first, 
small firms are more likely to be subsidized that large firms. Secondly, the R&D subsidy policies can induce the 
increase of private R&D investments only when individual rationality conditions are satisfied, which is not a 
guaranteed case. Van Long and Raff (2011) wrote the paper that they developed a simple model of international trade 
with heterogeneous firms to explore the effects of trade liberalization on firms’ innovation incentives as well as on 
industry productivity and social welfare. They argue that trade liberalization raises industry R&D expenditure when 
the trade cost is low, and reduces industry R&D expenditure when the trade cost is high. Giammario Impullitti (2006) 
discusses the welfare effects of international competition in the market for innovations. And analyzes how competition 
affects the costs and the benefits of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D subsidies. He shows that, first, increases in 
foreign competition produce a negative business-stealing effect that triggers an increase in the optimal R&D subsidy 
in the home country. Secondly, the home country does not benefit from cooperation in R&D subsidies at low levels 
of competition. But as foreign competitive threat grows home gains from cooperation become positive and increasing 
with competition. 
With the aim to provide new insights on the relationship between the optimal R&D policies and product 
differentiation considering asymmetric market size, section 2 describes the basic model structure. Section 3 examines 
the feature of market equilibrium when the level of product differentiation is very high, while section 4 determines the 
equilibrium when products are less differentiated with a higher level of competition. Based on the obtained results, 
section 5 discusses the policy implications and concludes. 
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2. Model 
2.1. Demand side 
We employ a model with two asymmetric countries and two firms. Firm 1 is located in and owned by the residents 
of Country 1, while Firm 2 is located in and owned by the residents of Country 2. The utility function of a representative 
consumer is given by: 
ଵ ൌ ଵଵଵ ൅Ƚଵଶଵ െቀ
୯భభమ
ଶ ൅
୯మభమ
ଶ ൅ ଵଵଶଵቁ           
ଶ ൌ ଶଶଶ ൅Ƚଶଵଶ െቀ
୯మమమ
ଶ ൅
୯భమమ
ଶ ൅ ଶଶଵଶቁ           
Country 1’s market size is represented by a_1and Country 2’s market size is represented by a_2. Here, q_ij 
represents the amount of product produced in country j that are consumed in country i. The first subscript thus indicates 
in which country the good is produced, and the second subscript in which country the good is consumed. The parameter 
bę[0,1} measures the degree of horizontal differentiation between the goods. The goods are completely independent 
if b=0, while they are identical in the limit b=1. More generally, the two goods are closer substitutes from the 
consumers’ point of view the larger is b. 
The end-user prices of the two goods in country 1 are denoted by p_11 and p_21, while p_22and p_12 denote the 
end-user prices of the two goods in country 2.  
Each country’s consumer surplus is: 
ଵ ൌ ଵ െ ଵଵଵଵ െ ଶଵଶଵ 
ଶ ൌ ଶ െ ଶଶଶଶ െ ଵଶଵଶ 
 
Provided that trade takes place, optimal consumer behavior implies that: 
μଵ μଵଵൗ ൌ
μଵ μଶଵൗ ൌ Ͳ , 
μଶ μଶଶൗ ൌ
μଶ μଵଶൗ ൌ Ͳ  
From this, we find that the inverse demand curves are given by: 
݌ଵଵ ൌ ܽଵ െ ܾ כ ݍଶଵ െ ݍଵଵ 
݌ଶଵ ൌ ܽଵ െ ܾ כ ݍଵଵ െ ݍଶଵ 
݌ଶଶ ൌ ܽଶ െ ܾ כ ݍଵଶ െ ݍଶଶ  
݌ଵଶ ൌ ܽଶ െ ܾ כ ݍଶଶ െ ݍଵଶ 
 
2.2. Supply side 
The firms incur trade costs (´ı0) for each unit they export to another country. We assume that trade costs are 
exogenously introduced. When R&D investment is absent, the marginal production costs of the firms are equal to c<
¢. But each firm may invest in R&D to reduce its marginal costs (c-x); therefore, the profit function of the firms is 
expressed as: 
ߨଵ ൌ ሺ݌ଵଵ െ ܿ ൅ ݔଵሻݍଵଵ ൅ ሺ݌ଵଶ െ ܿ ൅ ݔଵ െ ߬ሻݍଵଶ െ ݔଵଶ െ ݂ ൅ ݏଵ כ ݔଵ           
ߨଶ ൌ ሺ݌ଶଶ െ ܿ ൅ ݔଶሻݍଶଶ ൅ ሺ݌ଶଵ െ ܿ ൅ ݔଶ െ ߬ሻݍଶଵ െ ݔଶଶ െ ݂ ൅ ݏଶ כ ݔଶ           
The firms’ R&D cost is C(x)=x^2-f, in which x^2 is variable costs and f is fixed costs. The per-unit R&D subsidy 
level received by the firm from its domestic government are shown by s_1 and s_2. 
Welfare in each country is shown by the sum of the domestic consumer surplus and profits, minus R&D subsidies: 
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൅Ɏଵ െଵଵ           
ଶ ൌ ଶ ൅Ɏଶ െଶଶ           
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We considered a three-stage game, in which the governments set R&D subsidies at stage 1, the firms decide R&D 
levels at stage 2, and the firms decide quantities. We progressed from stage 3 to stage 1 using backward induction. 
In a monopoly case, we considered a two-stage game. The result is not changed.  
 
3. Optimal R&D subsidies in a monopoly case 
We assumed that Country 1 and Country 2 are monopolies in their own market segments, which amounts to b=0. 
This means that there are no strategic interactions between the firms, so they choose R&D investments and output 
independent of each other. 
Stage 2 
If there is trade, firm 1 and firm 2 yield monopoly outputs: ( డగభడ௤భభ ൌ
డగభ
డ௤భమ
ൌ Ͳ, డగమడ௤మమ ൌ
డగమ
డ௤మభ
ൌ Ͳ) 
ݍଵଵ ൌ 
ͳ
ʹ ሺܽଵ െ ܾݍଶଵ ൅ ݔଵሻ 
ݍଵଶ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ ሺെ߬ ൅ ܽଶ െ ܾݍଶଶ ൅ ݔଵሻ 
ݍଶଶ ൌ 
ͳ
ʹ ሺܽଶ െ ܾݍଵଶ ൅ ݔଶሻ 
ݍଶଵ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ ሺെ߬ ൅ ܽଵ െ ܾݍଵଵ ൅ ݔଶሻ 
The cost to the firm from increasing R&D investment by one unit is equal to (ǔ2xǕ_1-s_1 ), while its benefit 
equals (q_11+q_12 ). The firmÿs profit-maximizing behavior implies that:  
ሺʹݔଵ െ ݏଵሻ ൌ ሺݍଵଵ ൅ ݍଵଶሻ 
ሺʹݔଶ െ ݏଶሻ ൌ ሺݍଶଶ ൅ ݍଶଵሻ 
 We found that the best response combines monopoly outputs and profit-maximizing behavior. 
The outputs of firm 1 and firm 2 are: 
ݍଵଵ ൌ
ͳ
Ͷ ሺʹܽଵ ൅
ͳ
ͳ͸ ሺͳ͸߬ െ ͳ͸ܽଵ െ ͳ͸ܽଶ െ ͵ʹݏଵሻሻ 
ݍଶଵ ൌ
ͳ
Ͷ ሺʹܽଵ ൅ ʹሺ߬ െ ݔଶሻሻ 
ݍଵଶ ൌ
ͳ
Ͷ ሺʹܽଶ ൅ ʹሺ߬ െ ݔଶሻሻ 
ݍଶଶ ൌ
ͳ
Ͷ ሺʹܽଶ ൅ ʹሺ߬ ൅
ͳ
͵ʹ ሺͳ͸߬ െ ͳ͸ܽଵ െ ͳ͸ܽଶ െ ͵ʹݏଵሻሻሻ 
The R&D investments of firm 1 and firm 2 are:  
ݔଵ ൌ
ͳ
͵ʹ ሺെͳ͸߬ ൅ ͳ͸ܽଵ ൅ ͳ͸ܽଶ ൅ ͵ʹݏଵሻ 
ݔଶ ൌ
ͳ
͵ʹ ሺെͳ͸ሺ߬ െ ܽଵ െ ܽଶሻ ൅ ͵ʹݏଶሻ 
As the trade costs (τ) increase, the firms’ domestic sales are high. But exports, total benefit, and R&D investments 
are decreasing. While a lower R&D investment reduces the firm’s marginal production costs, the firm’s production 
costs increase and domestic sales decrease at the same time. 
451 Young-Han Kim and Bonju Gu /  Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  447 – 454 
 
Stage 1 
Each government determines R&D subsidies for maximizing domestic welfare, and they also want their domestic 
firms to hold a dominant trade position. The government therefore has an incentive to grant R&D subsidies to domestic 
firms. Spencer and Brander (1983) called this the “business-stealing effect.” In this part, we assumed that the firms 
are monopolies, so there are no strategic interactions between the firms (b=0); that is, a “business-stealing effect” is 
not active. If a government subsidizes a domestic firm, it is seeking to increase the consumer surplus, rather than 
increasing a firm’s profits. While firms do not benefit monetarily from a government’s subsidies, a country’s consumer 
surplus is increasing as a result.  
In a monopoly case, each government’s subsidy level is: 
ݏெଵ ൌ
െͳͻʹ߬ ൅ ͷ͹͸ܽଵ ൅ ͳͻʹܽଶ
ͳͳͷʹ  
ݏெଶ ൌ
െͳͻʹ߬ ൅ ͳͻʹܽଵ ൅ ͷ͹͸ܽଶ
ͳͳͷʹ  
As both country 1 and country 2 increase production, the government should increase the subsidy level (with 
superscript M for “monopoly”). 
Proposition 1 
Each government seeks a good position in their trade relations with each other, which provides the governments 
with an incentive to grant subsidies to domestic firms. When each firm is a monopolist in their own market segment, 
the government does not have an incentive to grant subsidies to domestic firms; but, granting subsidies increases the 
consumer surplus. As the trade costs decrease (trade liberalization), the government’s overall subsidy level increases. 
4. R&D policies with intra-industry trade 
In this part, we assumed that bę(0,1), meaning that the two goods are imperfect substitutes. Also, the variety of 
product and consumersÿ choice is decreasing in b (the consumers have convex preferences). 
4.1. Market equilibrium 
The firms choose the equilibrium quantities in stage 3 and choose the R&D investment in stage 2. 
Stage 3. Equilibrium quantities and equilibrium price 
By solving  
பగభ
డ௤భభ
ൌ డగభడ௤భమ ൌ Ͳ,
பగమ
డ௤మమ
ൌ డగమడ௤మభ ൌ Ͳ, we find the equilibrium quantities. 
 
ݍଵଵ ൌ  ൜െ
െʹܿ ൅ ܾܿ ൅ ܾ߬ ൅ ʹܽଵ െ ܾܽଵ ൅ ʹݔଵ െ ܾݔଶ
െͶ ൅ ܾଶ ൠ 
ݍଶଵ ൌ  ሼെ
െʹܿ ൅ ܾܿ െ ʹ߬ ൅ ʹܽଵ െ ܾܽଵ െ ܾݔଵ ൅ ʹݔଶ
െͶ ൅ ܾଶ ሽ 
ݍଵଶ ൌ  ሼെ
െʹܿ ൅ ܾܿ െ ʹ߬ ൅ ʹܽଶ െ ܾܽଶ ൅ ʹݔଵ െ ܾݔଶ
െͶ ൅ ܾଶ ሽ 
ݍଶଶ ൌ  ሼെ
െʹܿ ൅ ܾܿ ൅ ܾ߬ ൅ ʹܽଶ െ ܾܽଶ െ ܾݔଵ ൅ ʹݔଶ
െͶ ൅ ܾଶ ሽ 
Similar to the monopoly case, the firms have an incentive to invest in R&D for cost reduction, thereby increasing 
total production and subsidy levels. 
452   Young-Han Kim and Bonju Gu /  Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  447 – 454 
 
Combining the equilibrium quantities and the inverse-demand equation, we calculated the equilibrium price: 
݌ଵଵ ൌ  ሼ
ሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻሺͳ ൅ ܾሻܿ െ ܾ߬ ൅ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻܽଵ െ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾଶሻݔଵ ൅ ܾݔଶ
െͶ ൅ ܾଶ ሽ 
݌ଶଵ ൌ  ሼ
ሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻሺͳ ൅ ܾሻܿ ൅ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾଶሻ߬ ൅ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻܽଵ ൅ ܾݔଵ െ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾଶሻݔଶ
െͶ ൅ ܾଶ ሽ 
݌ଵଶ ൌ  ሼ
ሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻሺͳ ൅ ܾሻܿ െ ܾ߬ ൅ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻܽଶ ൅ ܾݔଵ െ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾଶሻݔଶ
െͶ ൅ ܾଶ ሽ 
݌ଶଶ ൌ  ሼ
ሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻሺͳ ൅ ܾሻܿ ൅ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾଶሻ߬ ൅ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻܽଶ െ ሺെʹ ൅ ܾଶሻݔଵ ൅ ܾݔଶ
െͶ ൅ ܾଶ ሽ 
So far, we have determined the equilibrium quantities and equilibrium price. Using  
பగభ
డ௫భ
ൌ பగమడ௫మ ൌ Ͳ, we then 
determined the equilibrium R&D investment. 
 
Stage 2. Equilibrium R&D investment 
R&D investment reduces marginal production costs and trade costs. If trade costs decrease, exports increase. 
Combining the equilibrium quantities and equilibrium price, we determined the equilibrium R&D investment: 
ݔଵ ՜
Ͷሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻሺʹܿ ൅ ߬ െ ܽଵ െ ܽଶሻ ൅ ሺെͶ ൅ ܾଶሻଶݏଶ
ͺܾ  
ݔଶ ՜
Ͷሺെʹ ൅ ܾሻሺʹܿ ൅ ߬ െ ܽଵ െ ܽଶሻ ൅ ሺെͶ ൅ ܾଶሻଶݏଵ
ͺܾ  
Higher trade costs increase the protection of the home market against foreign competition. We intuitively deduced 
that higher trade costs increase domestic sales; however, the direct effect of high trade costs reduces exports, 
decreasing total sales (sum of domestic sales and exports). By increasing trade costs, the government does not increase 
the firm’s R&D investment through its R&D-investment subsidies. Also, higher marginal production costs reduce 
domestic sales. 
Proposition 2  
As trade costs more decrease, domestic sales, exports, and R&D investment increase (only two goods are less 
substitutes).  
Stage 1.  The subsidy level 
The governments choose subsidy levels for maximizing domestic welfare. We assumed that governments non-
cooperatively choose subsidy levels. Each government simultaneously chooses a R&D-investment subsidy policy. 
s_1=  
((2(-(2+b)(-12+b(28+b(-10+b(-5+2b))))(8+b(-16+b(4+b(14+b(2-8b+b^3)))))τ+(-2+b)(288+b(-416+b(-
608+b(688+b(696+b(-632+b(-322+b(238+b(62+b(-37+2(-2+b)b)))))))))) a_1+(-2+b)(96+b(-288+b(-8+b^2  )(-
24+b(-8+b(18+b(2+(-4+b)b(2+b))))))) a_2  )))/(((-1+b) (-4+b^2  )^2  (-12+b(28+b(-10+b(-5+2b))))(-12+b(-28+b(-
10+b(5+2b))))) )  
ݏଶ ൌ  
 (2(-(2+b)(-12+b(28+b(-10+b(-5+2b))))(8+b(-16+b(4+b(14+b(2-8b+b^3)))))τ+(-2+b)(96+b(-288+b(-8+b^2)(-
24+b(-8+b(18+b(2+(-4+b)b(2+b)))))))a_1+(-2+b)(288+b(-416+b(-608+b(688+b(696+b(-632+b(-
322+b(238+b(62+b(-37+2(-2+b)b))))))))))a_2)))⁄(((-1+b)(-4+b^2 )^2  (-12+b(28+b(-10+b(-5+2b))))(-12+b(-28+b(-
10+b(5+2b))))))}}  
Country 1 and country 2’s subsidy levels are decreasing in trade costs. In other words, trade costs are increasing, 
while the subsidy levels are decreasing. 
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Fig. 1. Relationship in subsidy (s) and product differentiation (b) 
We assumed that country 1’s market size is α_1=1 and country 2’s market size is 0<α_2<1. 
In Figure 1, =1, α_2=0.5 is inserted randomly. 
The upper graph shows that the vertical axis line is S_1, while the horizontal line is bę(0,1). The lower graph 
shows that the vertical axis line is S_2, while the horizontal line is bę(0,1). 
In the upper graph, S_1 increases gradually when b is increased and increases steeply at around 0.5; but before 
reaching 0.6, S_1 becomes vertical. When b is around 0.6, it slowly increases in the absence of S_1.  
In the lower graph, S_2 is the opposite of S_1. The two goods are completely independent (b=0) and country 2’s 
subsidies are S_2. When b is over 0.5, S_2 rapidly decreases, and before reaching 0.6, S_2 becomes vertical. When b 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
454   Young-Han Kim and Bonju Gu /  Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  447 – 454 
 
is over 0.6, country 2’s subsidies are higher. Also, the lower graph shows that the subsidy level decreases when b 
increases. 
We assumed that country 1’s market size is bigger than that of country 2. The two goods are not close substitutes 
and country 1 grants more R&D subsidies. When b is over 0.6, country 1 does not subsidize, while country 2 grants 
more R&D subsidies. 
When the substitutability of the goods is lower, the lower is the level of competition between the firms. We 
mentioned above that, in a monopoly case, two firms do not need to contend with the “business-stealing effect.” 
Government therefore subsidizes to maximize the consumer surplus. 
Again, based on intuition, the closer the substitutability between two goods, the more excessive the competition—
in the end, only one firm survives. But in the graph, small-market country 2 grants more subsidies and remains in the 
market, while country 1 does not grant subsidies. The graph shows that when the two countries’ subsidy levels become 
vertical, b is almost 0.6. In the future, we will study why the two countries’ subsidy levels have the same feature at 0.6 
and why the line is vertical. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper tried to articulate the relationship between the government R&D policies and production differentiation 
taking consideration of the market size asymmetry. We focused on the case where corporate R&D investment 
strategies are mainly driven by the motivation to obtain price competitiveness with cost reduction effects of R&D. To 
enlarge our understanding about the relationship between the level of market competition and optimal R&D policies 
integrating the impact of market size of asymmetry when representative firms from each country compete in both 
markets, an oligopoly model with asymmetric market power and product differentiation was explored.  
Based on the model analysis, this paper demonstrated that the impact of the different level of product differentiation 
on the optimal R&D policies shows opposite features between a country with a large market size and a country with a 
small market size. For a country with a large market size, higher production homogenization with increased 
competition reduces the level of optimal R&D subsidy. On the other hand, for a country with a small market size, a 
higher level of production differentiation increases the level of optimal R&D subsidies. The economic intuition behind 
these finding is that for a small country with a lower market power, the benefits from R&D subsidies in increased in 
secured markets with higher production differentiation. In case of a large economy, the higher competition caused by 
the lower product differentiation provides higher benefits from the unit R&D subsidies supported by higher market 
power. 
These results involve the following caveats. The findings were based on a strong assumption of a linear inverse 
demand function. Although a linear inverse demand function captures majorities of economic features, it needs to be 
generalized for wider perspectives integrating all different types of utility preferences. In addition, the policy tools for 
strategic advantages need to be generalized including other types of strategic trade policies for more general insights, 
which would be the task for future researches.    
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